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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY CORP., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
HEIDI ROCK, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 930458-CA 
Priority No.2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the appeal of 
Appellant by virtue of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(2) (a) 
(1989), and Utah Judicial Code §78-2a-3(2)(f) (1992, 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Whether an off-duty Police Officer is justified in detaining 
a person for ten minutes while waiting for another police officer 
to arrive to perform further investigation? 
The Court will review Appellant's claim of error on the Trial 
Court's denial of her motion to suppress under a correction of 
error standard. State v. Munsen, 821 P.2d 13 (Utah App. 1991), 
State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 565 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The City relies upon the following statutes and Constitutional 
Provisions: 
I. United States Constitution, Amendment IV. 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to 
be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On July 19, 1992, Appellant Heidi Rock was Cited for the 
Offense of driving under the influence of alcohol and other 
infractions. She was later formally charged by Salt Lake City in 
an information in the Third Circuit Court with the same violations. 
On November 27, 1992, Rock filed a motion to suppress evidence, 
with supporting memorandum, in the Circuit Court. 
On March 18, 1993, an evidentiary hearing was held in front of 
the Honorable Judge Philip Palmer on Rock's motion to suppress. On 
request of the Court, the Plaintiff City of Salt Lake filed a 
written response to the motion to suppress on March 29, 1993. On 
April 6, 1993, Rock filed an answer to the City's response. 
On April 12, 1993, Judge Palmer denied defendant's motion to 
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suppress. On April 16, 1993, Judge Palmer reaffirmed the Court's 
decision on the motion to suppress. 
On June 17, 1993, Heidi Rock entered a plea of guilty to the 
charge of driving under the influence, preserving the right to 
appeal the Court's decision on the motion to suppress. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 19, 1992, Defendant Heidi Rock was stopped by Officer 
Jedd Hurst of the Salt Lake City Police Department when Officer 
Hurst observed her driving her car without headlights and making a 
wide right turn. Officer Hurst was off-duty, in uniform, at the 
time of the stop. R. at p. 63. Officer Hurst noted an odor of 
alcohol when he contacted Ms. Rock. R. at p. 64. 
Due to his observations of Defendant's physical condition and 
her apparent mental state, Officer Hurst asked Defendant to perform 
two field sobriety tests. Based on Defendant's performance on the 
tests, Officer Hurst formed the opinion that Defendant was under 
the influence of alcohol. R. at p. 71. 
Upon forming that opinion, Officer Hurst called for an on-duty 
Officer to respond and handle what Officer Hurst believed would 
ripen into an arrest for a DUI. R at p. 64. Officer Hurst took 
this action because Department Policy dictated that if an on-duty 
officer were available, the on-duty officer should be called to 
save overtime expense. R. at pp. 64, 72. Within five to ten 
minutes of the call from Officer Hurst, Officer Rusty Isaakson of 
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the SLCPD responded. R. at p. 65. Officer Isaakson requested 
Defendant perform field tests so that he could make an independent 
assessment of Defendant's condition. Two of the tests requested by 
Officer Hurst were also requested by Officer Isaakson. R. at pp. 
65, 66. 
Following Defendant's performance of the tests, Officer 
Isaakson arrested Defendant for DUI. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The detention of Heidi Rock was not constitutionally 
unreasonable. The initial officer acted reasonably in calling for 
an on-duty officer, and did not act unreasonably in waiting for the 
on-duty officer to finish the field tests. The five to ten minute 
wait is clearly not unreasonable, and the reasons for the wait are 
legitimate and valid and did not violate defendant's constitutional 
rights. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DETENTION OF DEFENDANT WAS NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
UNREASONABLE. 
A police officer may be justified in making an investigative 
stop based on less than probable cause. Terry v. Ohiof 3 92 U.S. 1, 
88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The determination of when 
an investigative stop or detention becomes constitutionally invalid 
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because of excessive length focuses not on the length of the 
detention alone, but on whether the police diligently pursued a 
means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain 
the defendant. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 105 S. Ct. 
1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah 
App. 1991); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App. 1990); State 
v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah App. 1992). 
In Sharpe, the issue of an excessive detention was raised when 
a defendant was detained 2 0 minutes by a State Highway Patrolman 
who was waiting for the assistance of a DEA agent. The Court 
concluded that the 20 minute detention was not unlawful. 
Considering the traditional justification for a Terry stop, the 
Court noted that: 
the brevity of the invasion of the individual's Fourth 
Amendment interests is an important factor in determining 
whether the seizure is so minimally intrusive as to be 
justifiable on reasonable suspicion, ... we have 
emphasized the need to consider the law enforcement 
purposes to be served by the stop as well as the time 
reasonably needed to effectuate those purposes. 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 685, 84 L.Ed 2d at 615. 
It is clear from the Court's discussion in Sharpe, that the 
determination focused not only on the length of the detention, but 
also on the reasonableness of the officer's actions. The Court was 
careful to note that: 
[t]he fact that the protection of the public might, in 
the abstract have been accomplished by "less intrusive" 
means does not, by itself, render the search 
unreasonable, [citations omitted]. The question is not 
simply whether some other alternative means was 
available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in 
failing to recognize or to pursue it. 
5 
Sharpe at 687, 84 L.Ed. 2d at 616. Other cases have confirmed this 
analysis.x 
The conduct of the Officer in Ms. Rock's case, clearly meets 
a standard of constitutional reasonableness, and was "diligent 
pursuit of a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel 
suspicions quickly.1' Sharpe at 686. Ms. Rock has argued that the 
Officer did not act diligently in pursuit of the investigation when 
he discontinued field tests awaiting the arrival of an on-duty 
officer. Such an argument is clearly erroneous in light of Sharpe. 
In Sharpe, a state patrolman detained an individual while 
waiting for another law enforcement officer who was better situated 
to conduct the investigation. The DEA agent was better able to 
conduct a full and proper investigation, although the State Highway 
Patrolman certainly had the authority and some experience in 
conducting narcotics investigations. The Court apparently did not 
consider this fatal to the actions of the officers.2 
1
 Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 105 S. Ct. 1643, 84 
L.Ed.2d 705 (1985), United States v. Gonzalez, 763 F.2d 1127 (10th 
Cir. 1985), United States v. Recalde, 761 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 
1985), United States v. Streifel. 781 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1986). 
Hayes, Recalde, and Gonzalez are distinguishable from Sharpe 
and Ms. Rock's situation. In Hayes, Recalde and Gonzalez, the 
defendant's were transported to the police station for further 
investigation without probable cause for their arrest. All three 
cases specifically note the distinction from Sharpe, where the 
investigation occurred in a much less coercive circumstance. 
Nevertheless, the four cases cited clearly indicate that the 
analysis focuses not only on the length, but on the reasonableness 
of the conduct. 
2
 Further error in Defendant's argument is shown by 
hypothesizing a situation envisioned by Ms. Rock. The initial 
Officer could have continued and conducted all the field tests, and 
then communicated the results of those tests to the second officer, 
who then would have transported defendant to the police department 
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Ms. Rock has also argued that the Officer's stated reasons for 
calling an on-duty Officer were inconsistent with his actions 
because he stayed on the scene an hour more to complete the impound 
of Ms. Rock's car. This is at odds with the record where the 
Officer clearly stated that processing the DUI completely would 
take as much as three hours. R. at p. 66, 67. The Officer's 
actions did result in a significant reduction in overtime pay. 
Clearly, the detention in the case now before the court was no 
more intrusive than the delay in Sharpe, and was occasioned by an 
equally legitimate purpose. Although Officer Hurst certainly could 
have conducted the investigation himself, he did not act 
unreasonably in calling for an on-duty officer. 
In United States v. Streifel, infra, p. 6, note 1, the 1st 
Circuit was faced with a factual situation somewhat like the 
present case. In Streifel, agents from the DEA and the Maine State 
Police set up a search operation based on information from an 
informant. The Officers waited at a home where they believed the 
defendants would be going. When the defendants arrived, the State 
Police blocked their cars in and immediately separated the two 
for a breath test. If a test were conducted and the result were 
under the legal limit, the second Officer would clearly be at a 
considerable disadvantage in determining whether or not the field 
tests warranted the issuance of a citation for driving while 
impaired by alcohol. It is clearly the better policy to have the 
Officer who administered the field tests conduct the breath test, 
or at least to have an officer who observed the field tests conduct 
the breath test, particularly where a ten minute wait is all that 
is sacrificed. 
It is also interesting to note that if the initial officer had 
conducted the entire investigation, the Defendant would have waited 
for some period of time for another officer or a tow truck driver 
to respond to complete the impound of the car. 
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defendants. They were asked by uniformed officers why they were 
there and for identification. Additionally, they were told they 
could not leave until the DEA agent in charge of the operation 
arrived. The DEA agent had been on the scene, but left shortly 
before the defendant's arrival. He was radioed on their arrival 
and returned to the scene about five minutes later. Once on the 
scene, he proceeded with the investigation. 
Defendants challenged the detention, saying that it was 
unreasonable that they would be required to wait until the DEA 
agents returned. The Court, in cursory fashion, rejected this 
claim by the defendants, noting: 
[F]inally, that Streifel and Quinn were told that they 
could not leave until Agent Steadman, the head of the 
investigation, returned, did not render the stop so 
unreasonable as to elevate it into a custodial situation 
requiring Miranda warnings. 
Streifel at 959. 
Clearly, in Streifel, the State Police had the ability to 
carry out the investigation in the same manner and collect evidence 
just as the DEA agent did. In fact, the State Police conducted a 
cursory search of one the vehicles, a search that was later 
repeated by the DEA agent because he had concerns about the 
legitimacy of the search conducted by the State Police. .Id. at 
956. This situation is analogous to the case at hand. Clearly, 
Officer Hurst's action were no more intrusive and were supported by 
equally valid public policy concerns. 
Other Federal case law on the issue of unlawful detention 
seems to note a distinction between cases challenging the length of 
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the detention as opposed to cases that address the reasonableness 
of the detention. See cases cited supra p. 6, note 1. 
In those case addressing the reasonableness of the detention, 
the Court notes a common thread, specifically the removal of a 
defendant from his home or another place to a police station, or an 
equally coercive situation, for further investigation. See Hayes 
at 815, 105 S. Ct. at 1646, Gonzalez at 1132, Recalde at 1456. The 
distinction drawn in these cases from Sharpe appears to be that the 
roadside situation in Sharpe did not share the same coercive 
aspects.3 Streifel appears to be consistent with this analysis. 
Utah case law has also followed the rule set out in Sharpe. 
In State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133 (Utah App. 1991), the Court of 
3
 Another possible distinction lies in the apparent lack of 
probable cause in Hayes and the similar cases cited. In none of 
those situations did the police have probable cause for a search or 
for an arrest. 
In the case now before this court, probable cause for an 
arrest arguably did exist. Although the testimony of the Officer 
at the suppression hearing was somewhat ambiguous, his final 
conclusion was that if she had refused to perform any more tests, 
he would have placed her under arrest. 
The standard to determine probable cause is whether there are 
sufficient articulable facts to warrant a person of reasonable 
caution in believing a crime has been or is or is about to be 
committed. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 94 L.Ed.2d 347, 107 S. 
Ct. 1149 (1988). The officer's observations of the driving 
pattern, the lack of headlights, the defendant's apparent 
difficulty communicating, the smell of alcohol, and the performance 
on the field tests arguably would seem to satisfy the standards of 
probable cause. 
If, in fact, the officer did have probable cause to arrest the 
defendant, any detention would clearly be reasonable as another 
officer would have needed to respond to secure defendant's car. 
Therefore, the detention would be harmless. State v. Cox, 787 P. 2d 
4, 7 (Utah App. 1990), State v. Featherstone, 781 P.2d 424, 431 
(Utah 1989). 
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Appeals of Utah upheld a 90 minute detention necessitated by a 
search of defendant's car. In Grovier, the Court noted 
specifically that the focus was not on the length of the detention, 
but on the means used by the officers to dispel their suspicions. 
Grovier at 136. 
The length of the detention in Grovier was apparently 
justified by the officer's concern for safety. Although the 
justification for the length of the detention was different from 
the justification presented by the Officer in the present case, the 
reasons are subject to the same reasonableness standard. Grovier 
distinctly noted that no major interruptions occurred during the 
search. Grovier at 136. Under the same reasonableness standard, 
it is difficult to imagine that five to ten minutes is a major 
interruption that would invalidate a proper investigation. 
SUMMARY 
Under either the United States Constitution or the 
Constitution of the State of Utah4, the Officer's actions were 
reasonable and justified and the detention of the Defendant Heidi 
Rock was proper. 
4
 As Defendant has presented no separate analysis under the 
State Constitution, and no reason is given as to why analysis would 
be different, the court should review the case under Federal 
Constitutional guidelines. State v. Dudley, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 13, 
P.2d (Utah App. 1993). 
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CONCLUSION 
For all the foregoing reasons the City respectfully requests 
that the Court deny the appeal of Defendant. 
Dated this 1st day of November, 1993. 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four true and 
correct copy of the above brief of appellee to defense counsel 
Mitch Zagar 3587 West 4700 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84118, and 
eight copies delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 400 Midtown 
Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102. 
this 1st day of November, 1993. 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, | MOTION TO SUPRESS EVIDENCE 
IN DUI CHARGE AND MOTION TO 
DISMISS OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HEIDI ROCK, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 925020755 TC 
COMES NOW, the defendant, HEIDI ROCK, by and through her attorney of record, 
MITCHEL ZAGER, and hereby moves this Honorable Court to supress all evidence after the 
unreasonable and unlawful detention of HEIDI ROCK on the grounds that she was illegally 
detained after performing field tests for Officer Jed Hurst; and on the basis that her 
constitutional rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment, as well 
as Article 1, §14 of the Utah Constitution were violated thereby. Defendant further moves this 
court to dismiss the charge of open container on the basis that the State has destroyed all tangible 
evidence of the alleged charge. 
Based upon the Motion, Points and Authorities, and surrounding circumstances, and in 
the interest of the furtherance of justice, defendant's motion should be granted. 
Defendant requests that oral argument be set in this matter. 
DATED this "2/7 day of November, 1992. 
TCHEL ZAGER 
Attorney for Defendant 
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the Motion to Suppress Evidence in D.U.I. 
Charge and MOtion to Dismiss Open Container Charge was sent via U.S. mail, postage pre-
paid, this 3 1 day of November 1992, to the following: Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 So. 
200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
C'X^cCuj £ylu^$j> 
Cindy Bruce 
MITCHEL ZAGER - 3968 
Attorney for Defendant 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
Telephone: 801-964-6100 
IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, | 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Plaintiff, | EVIDENCE IN D.U.I. CHARGE AND 
DISMISS OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE 
v. I 
HEIDI ROCK, | Case No. 925020755 TC 
Defendant. | Honorable Philip K. Palmer 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. HEIDI ROCK was detained by Officer Hurst between 5 and 10 minutes during which 
time she was required to wait for Officer Isaacson to arrive at the scene and conduct field tests, 
which included some of the field tests previously conducted by Officer Hurst. 
2. Officer Hurst had the same skills, training and qualifications as Officer Isaacson 
concerning DUI investigations and conducting field tests. 
3. Officer Hurst had observed the driving pattern and demeanor of Heidi Rock as she 
exited her vehicle. Officer Isaacson possessed no personal knowledge of those facts. 
4. Officer Hurst testified that the prolonged detention was necessitated by his off-duty 
status. 
II. 
THE PROLONGED DETENTION OF HEIDI ROCK BY OFFICER 
HURST VIOLATES BOTH THE UTAH AND UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTIONS AND WAS WITHOUT LEGITIMATE 
REASON AND THEREFORE UNREASONABLE 
Nowhere in case history has a Court held a detention permissible for the reason that an 
officer was off-duty. There are cases where Courts have held that a detention was permissible 
when legitimate reasons were shown. In United States vs. Sharpe. the Court found legitimate 
reasons to find the detention permissible where a patrolman detained a suspect until a DEA 
Agent with superior training and experience in dealing with narcotics investigations arrived at 
the scene. United States vs. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675, 105, S.Ct. 1568, 1576 (1985). In Sharpe 
the patrolman who made the stop lacked the training and experience in dealing with narcotics 
and did not know all the facts involved in the case which were known to the DEA Agent from 
his previous obser/ations. Id. at 1576. As further justification for the detention in Sharpe the 
Court recognized that the delay in the investigation was created by the defendant's own evasive 
actions in avoiding the police. IcL In determining whether a detention is permissible, the 
United States Supreme Court in Sharpe stated that: 
. . . whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as 
an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine 
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that 
was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during 
which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. Id. at 1575 
(emphasis added). 
The Sharpe Court pointed out that "the question is not simply whether some other 
alternative was available, but whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to recognize or 
to pursue it." Id^ at 1576. 
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In this instance the detention is impermissible, since Officer Hurst has testified that he 
possessed training and experience in dealing with DUI arrests equivalent to that of Officer 
Isaacson. Furthermore, Officer Hurst was better situated that Officer Isaacson to conduct the 
DUI investigation, having personally observed the driving pattern of Heidi Rock and her 
demeanor as she exited her vehicle. It was Officer Hurst in this case who possessed all the facts 
involved in the case, not Officer Isaacson. The legitimate reasons supporting the permissible 
detention in Sharpe are not present in this case. 
Legitimate reasons for a prolonged detention were also found in State vs. Grovier where 
a vehicle search occurred during a 90-minute period without major interruption and where the 
delay was necessitated to ensure the officers' safety. State vs. Grovier. 808 P.2d. 133 (Utah 
App. 1991). In our case there was no reason nor necessity to seek an alternative investigation 
procedure. There was only one course of action that was reasonable and that was for Officer 
Hurst to complete his investigation without delay by conducting a sufficient number of field tests 
to determine Heidi Rock's sobriety. Incidently, a hand-off arrest could have been made to 
Officer Isaacson in the event Heidi Rock was eventually arrested, thereby satisfying Officer 
Hurst's concern regarding his off-duty status. 
The Court in Grovier states that: 
. . . the detention must be temporary and last no longer than is 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Grovier at 136 
(emphasis added). 
In this case the prolonged detention was not necessary to determine whether Heidi Rock 
was under the influence of alcohol. Officer Hurst had the skills to complete the investigation 
and make the determination without delay. The fact that Officer Hurst was off duty is not a 
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legitimate reason recognized by any Court to detain an individual's freedom. Officer Hurst's 
failure to complete his investigation without delay is unreasonable, unnecessary and 
impermissible. Absent a legitimate reason, Heidi Rock's fundamental rights as guaranteed by 
the Utah and United States Constitutions were violated and require suppression of evidence 
following the unlawful detention. 
III. 
THE DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE BY SALT LAKE CITY POLICE 
OFFICERS REQUIRE DISMISSAL OF THE OPEN CONTAINER CHARGE 
In this instance Salt Lake City Police Officers destroyed material, tangible evidence 
which they allege was an open container of alcohol. Heidi Rock is denied her due process 
under the United States and Utah Constitutions and is deprived of an opportunity to effectively 
cross-examine and confront the allegations against her due to the destruction of material evidence 
as described. Her opportunity to test and otherwise examine the alleged evidence is gone as a 
result of the Officers' actions. 
Admission of the officers' testimony that the label on the bottle said vodka is hearsay and 
also violates the Best Evidence Rule. For the reasons stated, the charge of Open Container 
requires dismissal. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The unreasonable, unjustified and unnecessary detention of Heidi Rock violates her 
fundamental freedoms as guaranteed under the United States and Utah Constitutions as stated. 
The reason given that Officer Hurst was off-duty is not a legitimate reason, nor has it been 
recognized as such in any case cited as a justification to violating a person's fundamental rights. 
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This instance is plainly distinguishable from the legitimate reasons for extended detentions 
upheld in each of the cases cited before this Court. 
Furthermore, the destruction of material evidence requires dismissal of the Open 
Container Charge. 
Officer Hurst's arbitrary and unreasonable actions in detaining Heidi Rock without 
legitimate reason requires suppression of all the evidence obtained after the unlawful detention. 
Based upon the pleadings, testimony and oral argument, defendant moves this Honorable Court 
to grant this Motion for Suppression and Dismissal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J * _ day of April, 1993. 
Mitchel Zager 
Attorney for Defei 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing Motion To Suppress Evidence and 
Dismiss Open Container Charge was sent via U.S. mail, postage pre-paid, this 6th day of April, 
1993, to Salt Lake City Prosecutor, 451 South 200 East, Room 125, Salt Lake City, UT 84111. 
0] iAn^U4, (D\,L^CJLS 
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THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
Salt Lake City Coip, 
vs 
Heidi Rock, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant 
Decision 
Case No. 925020755TC 
The time for further responsive memorandum in the above entitled case having 
expired, the court now renders its decision on defendant's motion to suppress and dismiss. 
On the motion to suppress, the court finds that the detention of the defendant 
in order to wait for an on-duty officer to complete the investigation was not unreasonable. It 
served valid public interests and did not unreasonably detain the defendant. The motion to 
suppress is therefore denied. 
On the motion to dismiss the charge of open container, the fact that the officer 
destroyed the alleged alcohol and its container would go to the weight, not the admissibility 
of the evidence, and the defendant is not unduly prejudiced by the destruction. The motion 
to dismiss is accordingly denied. 
The matter is set for Jury Trial on the 19th of May at 9:00 a. m. 
will be provided. 
DATED this /J^ dav of April, 1993. 
No further notice 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Decision was mailed 
to : 
TODD J. GODFREY 
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION 
451 South 200 East # 125 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
and 
MR MITCHELL ZAGER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
3587 West 4700 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84118 
on the /J** day of April, 1993 
QL 
jumuiAL CODE 398 
a successor is appointed and qualified The presiding 
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as addi-
tional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction 
thereof for the period served 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judg-
ment in panels of three judges Assignment to panels 
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court 
of Appeals The Court of Appeals by rule shall pro-
vide for the selection of a chair for each panel The 
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a 
presiding judge from among the members of the court 
by majority vote of all judges The term of office of the 
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is 
elected A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
may serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or 
incapacity of the presiding judge 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the 
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges 
of the Court of Appeals In addition to the duties of a 
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge 
shall 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of 
panels, 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court, 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the 
Court of Appeals, and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme 
Court and the Judicial Council 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the 
same as for the Supreme Court 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals ju r i sd ic t ion . 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and pro-
cess necessary 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, 
and decrees, or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from 
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies 
or appeals from the district court review of infor-
mal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, ex-
cept the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer, 
(b) appeals from the district court review of 
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or other lo-
cal agencies, and 
(n) a challenge to agency action under 
Section 63-46a-12 1, 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except 
those from the small claims department of a cir-
cuit court, 
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record in criminal cases, except those involving a 
charge of a first degree or capital felony, 
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal 
cases, except those involving a conviction of a 
first degree or capital felony, 
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs sought by persons who are in-
carcerated or serving any other cnminal sen-
tence, except petitions constituting a challenge to 
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree 
or capital felony, 
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for ex-
traordinary writs challenging the decisions of the 
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(i) appeals from district court involving domes-
tic relations cases, including, but not limited to, 
divorce, annulment, property division, child cus-
tody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity, 
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only 
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify 
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review 
and determination any matter over which the Court 
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the re-
quirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of 
agency adjudicative proceedings 1992 
78~2a-4. Review of ac t ions b y Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the 
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certi-
orari to the Supreme Court 1986 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in 
Salt Lake City The Court of Appeals may perform 
any of its functions in any location within the state 
1986 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
Section 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2 Repealed 
78-3-3 Term of judges — Vacancy 
78-3-4 Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to cir-
cuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction 
when circuit and district court 
merged 
78-3-5 Repealed 
78-3-6 Terms — Minimum of once quarterly 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11 Repealed 
78-3-11 5 State District Court Administrative 
System 
78-3-12 Repealed 
78-3-12 5 Costs of system 
78-3-13 Repealed 
78-3-13 4 Counties joining court system — Pro-
cedure — Facilities — Salaries 
78-3-13 5, 78-3-14 Repealed 
78-3-14 5 Allocation of district court fees and 
fines 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17 Repealed 
78-3-17 5 Application of savings accruing to 
counties 
78-3-18 Judicial Administration Act — Short 
title 
78-3-19 Purpose of act 
78-3-20 Definitions 
78-3-21 Judicial Council — Creation — Mem-
bers — Terms and election — Re-
sponsibilities — Reports 
78-3-21 5 Data bases for judicial boards 
78-3-22 Presiding officer — Compensation — 
Duties 
78-3-23 Administrator of the courts — Ap-
pointment — Qualifications — Sal-
ary 
78-3-24 Court administrator — Powers, du-
ties, and responsibilities 
661 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Rule 26 
mit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or 
recognizance 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his 
own behalf and to present any information in mitiga-
tion of punishment, or to show any legal cause why 
sentence should not be imposed The prosecuting at-
torney shall also be given an opportunity to present 
any information material to the imposition of sen-
tence 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be 
tried in his absence, he may likewise be sentenced in 
his absence If a defendant fails to appear for sen-
tence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the 
court 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no 
contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall en-
ter a judgment of conviction which shall include the 
plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence Follow-
ing imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the 
defendant of his right to appeal and the time within 
which any appeal shall be filed 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the 
court shall issue its commitment setting forth the 
sentence The officer delivering the defendant to the 
jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commit-
ment to the jail or prison and shall make his return 
on the commitment and file it with the court 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a 
sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time 
Rule 23. Arrest of judgment 
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the 
court upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a 
defendant shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or 
admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the 
defendant is mentally ill, or there is other good cause 
for the arrest of judgment Upon arresting judgment 
the court may, unless a judgment of acquittal of the 
offense charged is entered or jeopardy has attached, 
order a commitment until the defendant is charged 
anew or retned, or may enter any other order as may 
be just and proper under the circumstances 
Rule 24. Motion for new trial. 
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon 
its own initiative, grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there is any error or impropriety which had 
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a 
party 
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writ-
ing and upon notice The motion shall be accompa-
nied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in 
support of the motion If additional time is required to 
procure affidavits or evidence the court may postpone 
the hearing on the motion for such time as it deems 
reasonable 
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made within 
10 days after imposition of sentence, or within such 
further time as the court may fix during the ten-day 
period 
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in 
the same position as if no trial had been held and the 
former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either 
m evidence or in argument 
Rule 25. Dismissal without trial. 
(a) In its discretion, for substantial cause and in 
furtherance of justice, the court may, either on its 
own initiative or upon application of either party, or-
der an information or indictment dismissed 
(b) The court shall dismiss the information or in-
dictment when* 
(1) There is unreasonable or unconstitutional 
delay in bringing defendant to trial, 
(2) The allegations of the information or in-
dictment, together with any bill of particulars 
furnished m support thereof, do not constitute 
the offense intended to be charged m the plead-
ing so filed, 
(3) It appears that there was a substantial and 
prejudicial defect m the impaneling or in the pro-
ceedings relating to the grand jury, 
(4) The court is without jurisdiction, or 
(5) The prosecution is barred by the statute of 
limitations 
(c) The reasons for any such dismissal shall be set 
forth m an order and entered m the minutes 
(d) If the dismissal is based upon the grounds that 
there was unreasonable delay, or the court is without 
jurisdiction, or the offense was not properly alleged in 
the information or indictment, or there was a defect 
in the impaneling or of the proceedings relating to 
the grand jury, further prosecution for the offense 
shall not be barred and the court may make such 
orders with respect to the custody of the defendant 
pending the filing of new charges as the interest of 
justice may require Otherwise the defendant shall be 
discharged and bail exonerated 
An order of dismissal based upon unconstitutional 
delay in bringing the defendant to trial or based upon 
the statute of limitations, shall be a bar to any other 
prosecution for the offense charged 
(e) In misdemeanor cases, upon motion of the pros-
ecutor, the court may dismiss the case if it is compro-
mised by the defendant and the injured party The 
injured party shall first acknowledge the compromise 
before the court or in writing The reasons for the 
order shall be set forth therein and entered in the 
minutes The order shall be a bar to another prosecu-
tion for the same offense, provided however, that dis-
missal by compromise shall not be granted when the 
misdemeanor is committed by or upon a peace officer 
while in the performance of his duties, or notously, or 
with an intent to commit a felony 
Rule 26. Appeals. 
(1) An appeal is taken by filing with the clerk of 
the court from which the appeal is taken a notice of 
appeal, stating the order or judgment appealed from, 
and by serving a copy of it on the adverse party oi his 
attorney of record Proof of service of the copy shal 1 be 
filed with the court 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether 
by verdict or plea, 
(b) an order made, after judgment, affecting 
the substantial nghts of the defendant, 
(c) an interlocutory order when, upon petition 
for review, the appellate court decides that the 
appeal would be in the interest of justice, or 
(d) any order of the court judging the defen-
dant by reason of a mental disease or defect in-
competent to proceed further in a pending prose-
cution 
(3) An appeal may be taken by the prosecution 
from 
(a) a final judgment of dismissal, 
(b) an order arresting judgment, 
(c) an order terminating the prosecution be-
cause of a finding of double jeopardy or denial of 
a speedy tnal, 
(d) a judgment of the court holding a statute or 
any part of it invalid, 
